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Imposing Company Ownership Transparency
Requirements: Opportunities for Effective
Governance of Equity Capital Markets or
Constraints on Corporate Performance
Dr. Avnita Lakhani*
Abstract
This article focuses on the relationship between transparency,
corporate governance of publicly traded companies, and capital markets. The
central question of this article is: if the requirements of ownership
transparency are imposed on companies, does this create opportunities for
effective governance of capital markets or does this impose constraints on
corporate performance? Capital markets include equity markets (stocks) and
debt markets (bonds). Equity is the price that investors (e.g., lenders,
shareholders) will pay for a company’s stock. The value of that equity
depends on the company’s corporate governance system, which effectively is
an equity contract outlining the terms of the equity investment. Corporate
governance systems allow stakeholders to monitor the company’s
performance and to adopt and execute measures to deal with poor
performance. Transparency is essential to corporate governance since it
allows for the monitoring of company’s performance through disclosure of
finances, profits, losses, and related reporting. Professor Gilson argues that
two forms of transparency are required for effective corporate governance:
financial disclosure and ownership transparency.1 There is ample scholarly
literature on the topic of financial disclosure regulations and obligations.
This article focuses primarily on company ownership transparency.
Ownership transparency refers to disclosure about majority shareholders, in
particular, as well as knowledge and disclosure of minority shareholders for
the purposes of protecting such shareholders. On the one hand, ownership
transparency can improve a company’s performance by preventing “a
controlling shareholder’s divergence of earnings or opportunities to itself.”2
On the other hand, ownership transparency requirements may unduly burden
issuers and shareholders alike as well as create a negative impact on
corporate performance. This article addresses these issues and discusses
possible solutions.
Keywords: company ownership disclosure, beneficial ownership,
transparency, capital markets, corporate governance, EU Transparency
Directive, Securities Exchange Act 1934, international and comparative law

*Dr. Avnita Lakhani’s expertise is in the fields of commercial law, business law,
international conflict resolution, and international and comparative law.
1
See Ronald J Gilson, Transparency, Corporate Governance and Capital Markets,
(2000). This paper was presented at the first meeting of the Latin American
Corporate Governance Roundtable, São Paulo, Brazil.
2
Id. at 6.
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INTRODUCTION
Creating

companies

is

synonymous

with

entrepreneurship,

innovation, and, to some, the achievement of a life-long dream. In the United
States alone, over two million corporations and limited liability corporations
(LLCs) are created annually,3 arguably a testament to the U.S. being an
attractive market in which to do business. Similarly, millions of companies
are created each day on a worldwide level. However, there is a potential dark
side. Many create corporations to fulfill genuine business purposes; in the
U.S. alone, for example, states allow people and entities to create companies
without knowing the true identity of the company’s beneficial owners.4 The
same is true around the world in other jurisdictions to a lesser or greater
extent, especially jurisdictions considered to be tax havens.
In 2013, the International Consortium of Investigative Reporters
disclosed almost two million documents that highlighted the problem of
identifying owners of company vehicles. 5 This extensive set of leaked
documents revealed the corporate ownership of “thousands of companies and
trusts set up in the British Virgin Islands and Cook Islands.” 6 These
previously anonymous owners included “Asian politicians to Canadian
lawyers – and no fewer than 4,000 Americans.”7 Global Witness, a UK-based
non-governmental organization, conducted an investigation into hidden
company ownership and found troubling consequences of the non-disclosure
of company ownership. For example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), the government sold the state’s mining assets at below market value
to companies registered in the British Virgin Islands, a territory with no
formal laws on disclosing company ownership. 8 The owners of these
companies were kept secret. However, the Global Witness investigation
3

Dean Kalant, Who’s in Charge Here?: Requiring More Transparency in Corporate
America: Advancements in Beneficial Ownership for Privately Held Companies, 42
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1049, 1050 (2009) (citing Staff of Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations, Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov't Affairs, Levin-ColemanObama Introduced Bill to Stop Misuse of U.S. Companies (May 1, 2008)).
4
Id. at 1051.
5
Max Biedermann, G8 Principles: Identifying the Anonymous, 11 B.Y.U. INT'L L. &
MGMT. REV. 72, 73-74 (2015).
6
Id. at 315 (citing Leaky Devils, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2013), available at
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576146-tax-havens-startreassess-their-business-models-leaky-devils).
7
Id .
8
Company Ownership: Which places Are the Most and Least Transparent?, GLOBAL
WITNESS
2
(2013)
available
at
https://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/GW_CA_Company%20Own
ership%20Paper_download.pdf [hereinafter Global Witness Report].
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discovered that these companies in the British Virgin Islands were associated
with an Israeli billionaire who was a friend of the DRC’s president.9 The state
mining assets, which effectively belong to the nation and its people, were
sold in the open market at above commercial valuation.10 The transactions
thus created profits for the companies and most likely, the president of the
DRC, but resulted in a loss of nearly $1.3 billion to the nation of Congo and
its people.11
There are many more cases similar to the above situation. In 2008, a
Financial Times analyst reported on a “secret” method, where the carmaker
Porsche used “equity derivatives to conceal economic ownership of shares
(‘hidden ownership’)”12 to build up a large stake in Volkswagen. A similar
phenomenon, “the exercise of voting power without corresponding economic
interest (‘empty voting’),”13 stems from the lack of strong and consistent
company ownership disclosure rules. Moreover, in 2010, the United States
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (the Subcommittee)
submitted a report on keeping foreign corruption outside the United States.14
In its report, the Subcommittee highlighted the histories of four cases
regarding foreign corruption, including one case where the son of the
president of Equatorial Guinea set up shell companies in the State of
California as well as in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) to purchase a $30
million dollar mansion and a $37.5 million dollar Gulfstream jet, despite
having a mere modest income.15 The US Senate Subcommittee’s 2010 report
was consistent with the 2011 World Bank study of 213 large-scale corruption
cases, which found that over 70% corruption cases involved the use of shell
companies. 16 This scenario in particular highlights the issue of potential
9

Id.
Id. at 2-3.
11
Id.
12
Michael C. Schouten, The Case for Mandatory Ownership Disclosure, 15 STAN.
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 130 (2009).
13
Id.
14
See Keeping Foreign Corruption out of the United States: Four Case Histories:
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Homeland Sec. & Gov’t
Affairs,
United
States
Senate
(2010)
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56840/html/CHRG111shrg56840.htm.
15
Id., at 2.
16
Poverty, Corruption, and Anonymous Companies, GLOBAL WITNESS 2 (2014),
available at http://www.globalwitness.org/library/anonymous-companies-globalwitness-briefing [hereinafter Anonymous Companies]; see The Misuse of Corporate
Vehicles, Including Trust and Company Service Providers, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK
FORCE
(2006),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Misuse%20of%20Corporate%20Vehicles%20i
10
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financial crimes associated with hidden company ownership. Additionally, in
September 2013, the BBC News reported on the issue of tax evasion and
hidden company ownership by highlighting how the then-209th richest man
in America, who had an estimated net worth of $2.9 billion, “hid more than
$3 million (£ 1.9 million) of income in a secret Swiss bank account.”17
Each of the above events highlights the dangers of the absence of any
mandatory requirement of corporate ownership disclosure, as well as the lack
of enforcing the existing rules of beneficial ownership disclosure. It is a
potential minefield laced with a deadly combination of low corporate and
financial innovation, questionable profit, and unsustainable company
practices that can lead to self-dealing (e.g., asset stripping, related party
transactions, and share dilutions), tax evasion, money laundering, terrorism
financing, and other financial crimes resulting from and encouraging the nondisclosure of a company’s ownership.18
The increasing risks of hidden company ownership finally reached
the attention of high-level political leaders at the 2013 G8 Summit in Lough
Erne, Northern Ireland. The G8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Russia, United States of America, and the United Kingdom )
announced the “G8 Principles,” a set of eight principles, or a “beneficial
ownership action plan,”19 designed to improve the transparency of company
ownership as well as combat the misuse and abuse of companies via legal
arrangements.
This article focuses on the relationship between transparency (in
particular, transparency of company ownership), corporate governance of
ncluding%20Trusts%20and%20Company%20Services%20Providers.pdf (stating that
a shell company has no viable operations or assets); see also The Role of Domestic
Shell Companies in Financial Crime and Money Laundering: Limited Liability
Companies, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT
NETWORK
2-4
(2006),
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/files/LLCAssessment_FINAL.pdf.
17
Beanie Babies creator Ty Warner to admit tax evasion, BBC NEWS (September 18,
2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24155274.
18
Biedermann, supra note 5, at 72; see also John G. Edwards, Registered Agents
Fight Bill Requiring Corporate Ownership Records, L. V. REV. J. (May 3, 2008),
available at 2008 WLNR 8389953 (hereinafter Registered Agents) (explaining that
while not all corporations and LLCs are created for illegitimate reasons, lack of
beneficial owner transparency has caused numerous problems relating to money
laundering, tax evasion, terrorism, and other misconduct).
19
Biedermann, supra note 5, at 74; see also Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at
2; G8 Action Plan Principles to Prevent the Misuse of Companies and Legal
Arrangements,
GOV.UK
(2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/20753
2/G8-Action-Plan-principles-to-prevent-the-misuse-of-companies-and-legalarrangements.pdf [hereinafter G8 Action Plan Principles].
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publicly traded companies and capital markets. The central question of this
article can be stated as follows: if requirements of ownership transparency are
imposed on companies, does this create opportunities for effective
governance of equity capital markets or does this impose constraints on
corporate performance?
Following the introduction in Part I of the article, Part II analyses the
relationship between capital markets and company ownership disclosure. Part
III evaluates the European Union Directive on Transparency (EU
Transparency Directive), which is considered one of the most comprehensive
directives aimed at increasing disclosure of company beneficial ownership
across the European Union. Part IV of the article focuses on initiatives in the
United States that aim at improving beneficial ownership transparency,
including the current requirements under the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Act 1934 and the most recent reintroduction of a proposed bill on corporate
transparency called the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement
Assistance Act (“ITLEAA” or “the Levin Bill”) in August 2013.20 Part V
shifts the focus from the EU and U.S. towards other international efforts in
mandating disclosure of beneficial ownership, such as efforts by the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
recommendations by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and ownership
disclosure regimes of nations other than the EU and U.S. Part VI consolidates
the analysis in the previous sections of the article to highlight some of the
outstanding issues related to beneficial ownership transparency requirements
and its impact on corporate performance, if any. To that end, Part VI of the
article makes policy recommendations for addressing these outstanding
issues. Finally, Part VII provides concluding remarks.
I.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL MARKETS AND
COMPANY OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE
A.

Building Strong Capital Markets

In his 2001 article on strong securities markets, Professor Bernard
Black argued that establishing “the preconditions for a strong market for
common stocks and other securities” was a challenge for all economies.21
One need only refer to those recent 2015 events in China’s stock exchanges
20

Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, S. 1465, 113th
Cong. (2013) available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senatebill/1465.
21
Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 781 (April 2001).
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to learn that such challenge is a genuine issue, even today. Professor Black
argues that in order to establish a strong market of securities, the complex
web of legal and market institutions must address two issues of investor
protection, namely ensuring that minority shareholders “(1) receive good
information about the value of a company's business and (2) have confidence
that a company's managers and controlling shareholders won't cheat them out
of most or all of the value of their investment.”22 By pointing out the above
issues, Professor Black is more concerned about the transparency of company
information, as well as potential issues arising out of the unsavoury conducts
of the company directors and controlling shareholders that may impact the
company’s value and their ripple effects on capital markets. These two
requirements are also at the heart of the debate on beneficial ownership
disclosure and transparency.23
For the purposes of this article, capital markets are “meeting places
where those who require additional capital seek out others who wish to invest
their excess.”24 They can be in the form of long-term debt or equity-backed
securities. Capital markets include equity markets (stocks) and debt markets
(bonds). As used in this abstract, equity markets refer to stock markets or
exchanges (securities), where shares of a company are publicly traded,
subject to a variety of regulations, codes of conduct, and charters.
Capital markets can be categorized into primary and secondary
markets. Primary markets serve as “a market for creating and originating new
financial instruments.” 25 Secondary markets are used for trading existing
financial instruments and products.26 Equity is the price that investors (e.g.,
lenders, shareholders) will pay for a company’s stock. The value of such
equity depends on the company’s corporate governance system, which
effectively is an equity contract outlining the terms of the equity investment.
22

Id.
There is a distinction between disclosure and transparency for while regulations
may require issuers and shareholders to disclose their economic interest in a company
to intermediaries or agencies, that information may not be transparent to the issuing
company or transparent to the public. The level of transparency is key to the debate.
24
ANDREW CHISOLM, AN INTRODUCTION TO CAPITAL MARKETS: PRODUCTS,
STRATEGIES, PARTICIPANTS, 1 (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd (2002) (While these meeting
places can be physical meeting places, they are now increasing virtual or online
meeting places.) Note: Capital markets are distinct from money markets, which are
aimed at more short-term loans and financing. See also Avnita Lakhani, China’s
Shadow Banking Industry and Impact on Capital Markets: Ignoring the Lessons of
the Past (publication forthcoming in the JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
LAW (August 2015)).
25
CHISOLM, supra note 26, at 2.
26
Id.
23
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When a company has good corporate governance, the value of its stock is
likely to be higher and the cost of borrowing capital lower.27
On a broader scale, good corporate governance ensures that markets
and enterprises may function efficiently and in accordance with society’s
goals. 28 A healthy corporate governance system allows stakeholders to
monitor the company’s performance, and to adopt and execute measures to
deal with poor performance. In addition, a sustainable corporate governance
framework can promote investor confidence,29 assist the company in meeting
investor expectations, allow the exercising of shareholder rights in an
effective way,30 encourage sound decision making on behalf of the company,
and help regulators and agencies deal with systemic issues such as the ability
to “determine the origins of investment flows, to prevent money laundering
and tax evasion and to settle issues of corporate accountability.”31
Transparency is essential to achieve good corporate governance
because it provides the ability to monitor company performance through
disclosure of finances, profits, losses, and other related reporting. Without
transparency, it would be impossible for a country to support equity markets
and ensure the stability of industry. As argued by Vermeulen, “a good
corporate

governance

infrastructure

should

combine

transparency,

accountability and integrity and this requires knowledge of beneficial

27

See, e.g., Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities
Regulation around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 81, 93 (2007)
(discussing the relationship between market efficiency, good corporate governance,
and lower cost of capital).
28
Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Beneficial Ownership and Control: A Comparative Study
Disclosure, Information and Enforcement 5 (March 2012), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4dkhwckbzv-en. This paper was discussed in a panel as
part of a technical seminar of the OECD Russia Corporate Governance Roundtable
organized for March 2012 in Moscow, Russian Federation.
29
See, e.g., Schouten, supra note 12, at 132 (quoting the first recital of Directive
2004/109/EC, On the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to
Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated
Market, O.J. (L 390) 38 (2004) [hereinafter Transparency Directive] to show how
one of the purposes of the EU Transparency directive is to boost investor
confidence); see also Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 237, 253 (2009).
30
Schouten, supra note 12, at 134 (citing the Transparency Directive in terms of its
goal of “enabl[ing] investors ‘to acquire or dispose of shares in full knowledge of
changes in the voting structure; it should also enhance effective control of share
issuers and overall market transparency of important capital movements’”);
Transparency Directive, supra note 31,at 18.
31
Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 5.
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ownership.”32 In turn, ownership disclosure improves market efficiency and
corporate governance.33
This knowledge consists of not only the identity of the controlling
owners (or, as argued by some, all owners), but also knowledge of the
controlling structures of listed companies. Knowledge of beneficial owners
and the control structures of listed companies must then be accompanied by
effective investigation and enforcement mechanisms regarding disclosed
information about beneficial ownership.34
Ownership transparency refers to disclosure regarding majority
shareholders 35 in particular, but can also refer to disclosure regarding
minority shareholders for the purposes of protecting such shareholders. As
seen by recent events, majority shareholders can play an activist or pacifist
role as owners of a company, thus affecting the company’s performance. As
highlighted by Professor Gilson, a company’s performance can suffer “a
controlling shareholder’s divergence of earnings or opportunities to itself.”36
Transparency and disclosure of ownership provides numerous benefits
to the capital market and society as a whole. First, it can facilitate better
management of the company and produce a positive impact on capital
markets.37 For example, ownership disclosure can improve market efficiency
by “creating transparency of the voting structure and of changes in the voting
structure…enable[ing] investors to anticipate agency costs and to assess the
implications for the value of a firm's share,”38 and inform share price as well
as ensure the accuracy of that price “by creating transparency of economic

32

Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 2; Gilson, supra note 1 at 6, 7 (stating that two forms
of transparency, financial disclosure and ownership transparency, are required for
effective corporate governance); OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) 51
(2004) (stating that ownership disclosure is “one of the basic rights' of investors”).
33
See Schouten, supra note 12, at 133 (defining an efficient market as one “in which
prices always fully reflect available information.”); Gilson, supra note 1, at 6; see
also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
34
Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 15.
35
Gilson, supra note 1, at 6 (defining ownership transparency such that “companies
disclose the identity of shareholders who own significant amounts of corporate stock,
as required in the United States by the Securities Exchange Act and in the European
Community by the Tranparency Directive.”)
36
Id.
37
As an example, once can look at recent events in July 2015 where China’s stock
market plunged and suffered a rout. There, the majority of controlling shareholders
are state-owned companies although in Shanghai’s stock exchange, the players are
mainly private investors in company stock.
38
Schouten, supra note 12, at 180.
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interests of shareholders, of trading interest and of the size of the free float.39
Second, ownership disclosure can improve enforcement within firms of both
concentrated ownership and dispersed ownership. In firms with concentrated
ownership, or “blockholder systems,” such as those found in Europe, Asia,
and most other capitalist economies, 40 disclosure of beneficial ownership
allows for better “monitoring of the controlling shareholder, thus preventing
extraction of private benefits.”41 In firms with dispersed ownership or socalled market systems characterized by “small and numerous shareholdings,
liquid trading markets…high frequency trading and rapid and continuous
changes in share ownership,”42 disclosure of beneficial ownership improves
enforcement “by facilitating the market for corporate control, the mechanism
through which management is disciplined by takeovers and the threat
thereof” 43 and by “facilitat[ing] communication among shareholders and
between companies and their shareholders.”44
However, a counter-argument often made is that ownership
transparency requirements may unduly burden the controlling shareholders
and negatively impact corporate performance since such ownership
transparency requirements may disclose shareholders’ financial standing,
prevent activism necessary to promote corporate growth, and result in a level
of corporate politics that is detrimental to effective corporate governance. In
the hands of the unscrupulous, too much information can become a sword that
cuts the shield of good intentions and good corporate governance. Currently
the debate and laws surrounding the requirements of disclosure of company
ownership have mainly focused on ‘beneficial ownership’ transparency.
However, clearly defining ‘beneficial ownership’ is a difficult task, and
enforcing sufficient transparency requirements can be more complicated than
expected.

39

Id.; see, e.g. , Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 348-368 (2003) (studying
the relationship between strict disclosure requirements and finding that “[t]he results
of the study suggest that share prices became more informed as a result of the
enhanced disclosure requirements, which supports the view that mandatory issuer
disclosure can increase share price accuracy and share price informedness.”); see also
Schouten, supra note 12, at 134.
40
Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 7 (discussing the ‘vertical agency problem’ in firms
with concentrated ownership or blockholder systems).
41
Schouten, supra note 12, at 180.
42
Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 7, 18 (discussing the ‘vertical agency problem’ in
firms with dispersed ownership or market systems).
43
Schouten, supra note 12, at 180.
44
Id.
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Defining and Disclosing Beneficial Ownership

The United Kingdom created the legal concept of beneficial
ownership under its trust laws. 45 A beneficiary is defined as one who
“ultimately controls an asset and can benefit from it.”46 The Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) defines beneficial ownership as “the natural person(s)
who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the natural person on
whose behalf a transaction is being conducted…also includes those persons
who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement.”47
In the United States, Rule 13d-3(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 defines a beneficial owner of a security as:
Any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract,
arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise has or
shares: (i) voting power which includes the power to vote, or
to direct the voting of, such security; and/or, (ii) investment
power which includes the power to dispose, or to direct the
disposition of, such security.48
However, the newly proposed Incorporation Transparency and Law
Enforcement Assistance Act of 2013 (the “Levin Bill” or “ITLEAA”) does
not adopt the same definition of beneficial owner as the Securities &
Exchange Act of 1934. According to ITLEAA, a beneficial owner is defined
as “an individual who has a level of control over, or entitlement to, the funds
or assets of a corporation or [LLC] that, as a practical matter, enables the
individual, directly or indirectly, to control, manage, or direct the corporation
or [LLC].”49
In the European Union (EU), the EU Transparency Directive extends
disclosure by the beneficial owner, which extends to encompass a variety of
definitions. For example, as explained by Schouten, the EU Transparency
45

Biedermann, supra note 3, at 74.
Id. (quoting Emile Van Der Does De Willebois, Emily H. Halter, Robert A.
Harrison, Ji Won Park & J.C. Sharman, The Puppet Masters, 18 (2010), available at
http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821388945).
47
International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism & Proliferation - the FATF Recommendations, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK
FORCE
ON
MONEY
LAUNDERING
110
(2012),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recom
mendations.pdf
48
United States Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a)
(2010); see also Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 21.
49
Kalant, supra note 3, at 1051 (quoting ITLEAA, S. 569, 111th Cong.
§3(a)(1)(a)(1)(e)(1) (2009)) (August 2013 was the third time that ITLEAA was
introduced before Congress. It was first introduced in May 2008 and re-introduced in
March 2009.); see also Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 21; Schouten, supra note 12, at
164; J. W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the “Incorporation
Transparency Act”, 70 LA. L. REV. 857, 859 (Spring 2010).
46
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Directive uses “various criteria…to try to capture the beneficial owner, such
as ‘power to exercise dominant influence or control,’ ‘discretion,’
‘instruction,’” and “‘independently.’” 50 Disclosure obligations extend to
parties who have access to voting rights,51 including those who hold shares
indirectly through controlled entities. Furthermore, disclosure requirements
apply to “parties acting in concert or to parties on whose behalf shares are
held by a third party.” 52 Parties who hold equity derivatives are also
considered beneficial owners and are subject to the disclosure requirements.53
A

final

noteworthy

definition

of

beneficial

owner

is

by

Computershare, a listed company that identifies itself as “a global market
leader in transfer agency and share registration, employee equity plans, proxy
solicitation and stakeholder communications.”54 In Computershare’s March
2015 international market analysis of 14 countries55 with respect to, among
many items, the transparency of share ownership, the report defines
beneficial owner as simply “an investor who owns an interest in a security.”56
According to Computershare’s definition, the beneficial owner may hold
legal title to the shares or has contracted with an intermediary and is thus an
indirect holder.57 In either case, the beneficial owner “may be entitled to not
only monetary rights but also voting rights “depending on local laws and
agreements.” 58 The report also distinguishes between a non-objecting
beneficial owner (NOBO) and an objecting beneficial owner (OBO), where a
NOBO consents to being disclosed to an issuer as a beneficial owner while an
OBO refuses to disclose its identity to the issuer by an intermediary. 59
50

Schouten, supra note 12, at 163.
Id.
52
Id. at 163-164, n 84.
53
Id. at 164.
54
Clare Corney, Kirsten Van Rooijen, and Amanda Kaut, Transparency of Share
Ownership, Shareholder Communications and Voting in Global Capital Markets,
COMPUTERSHARE
46
(2015),
http://www.computershare.com/au/business/gcm/regulatory-and-marketinitiatives/submissions-andpapers/Documents/TransparencyofShareOwnershipShareholderCommunicationsand
Votinginglobalcapitalmarkets_12032014.pdf (Note that the report was done in
collaboration with Georgeson, a company which identifies itself in the report as “the
world’s foremost provider of strategic shareholder services to corporations and
shareholder groups working to influence corporate strategy”).
55
Corney et al. supra note 56 (The 14 countries included in the market analysis
included: Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, United
Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, Russia, United States, and Canada).
56
Id. at 35.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
51
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From the myriad definitions above, two key observations are
noteworthy. First, if a valid argument for disclosure of beneficial ownership
is made in order to “cure the illness” of hidden company ownership, there
must be an easy way to understand and clarify the definition of “beneficial
ownership,” which shall apply across all jurisdictions. Specifically, the
definition must take into account three key elements: voting power, control
power, and investment power. Second, from the perspective of effective
disclosure and enforcement, the definition needs to encompass a range of
voting, control, and/or investment power that makes the beneficial owner
subject to disclosure regulation, investigation, and prosecution. Currently, the
definitions are either too all-encompassing, or they are difficult to track and
enforce.
C.

Defining and Enforcing Transparency

Backer defines transparency as applicable in two arenas. Within an
organization or community, transparency “enhances its operation and
disciplines its members.”60 Outside an organization, transparency can be used
“to enhance legitimacy (norm) and accountability (technique) among
stakeholders who have an interest in but not a direct participation in the
operation of the enterprise.” 61 Defining transparency in the context of
mandatory beneficial ownership is also a challenge, yet it is in defining the
level of desired transparency that the concept of beneficial ownership
disclosure can have any effective and enforceable meaning.
For example, Computershare’s 2015 market analysis report
distinguishes between “disclosures required to be made by investors when
they trigger certain ownership levels, specified by legislation, and issuer
rights to proactively demand identification of their investor.” 62 Because
Computershare’s 2015 report focused on the latter, namely, an issuer’s right
to demand a list of their investors, its definition of transparency is “visibility
of the underlying beneficial owners of shares to an issuer.”63 This appears to
suggest that the issuers and investors have the ability to access a private
registry. However, according to Global Witness, transparency measures the

60

Larry Catá Backer, Transparency Between Norm, Technique, and Property in
International Law and Governance: The Example of Corporate Disclosure Regimes
and Environmental Impacts, 22 MINN. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (Winter 2013).
61
Id.
62
Corney et al., supra note 58, at 1.
63
Id. at 35-36.
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“need to be exactly that: transparent.”64 As argued by Global Witness, this
presumes the existence of a public registry since a private registry “no matter
how well implemented, is simply not that much help.” 65 Under Global
Witness’ definition of a public registry, details of company ownership would
be available to and accessible by everyone in the world, including issuers,
investors, journalists, and ordinary citizens, without the boundaries of
jurisdictional rules and regulations.
The theory of establishing transparency of beneficial ownership
through a public registry garners further support from the second principle of
the G8 Principles, the UK’s proposed action plan on beneficial ownership as
outlined in a discussion paper called The Transparency & Trust: Enhancing
the Transparency of UK Company Ownership and Increasing Trust in UK
Business, the proposed Levin Bill of the US Congress, and the EU’s
Transparency Directive, which foresees that such information will be
“disseminated…to the public throughout the Community.”66 However, for
each of the above-mentioned jurisdictions, the definition of public registry is
akin to a national, centralized registry. As acknowledged by the UK, for
example, it “cannot require overseas companies operating in the UK to
disclose beneficial ownership information to a UK registry.”67 It is likely that
other jurisdictions face similar restrictions in addition to the costs for both
issuers and investors in meeting the requirements for a private or public
registry.
Despite the support for transparency, it is clear that the level and
nature of transparency with respect to beneficial ownership disclosure has not
reached a point of consensus. Such consensus, to a greater degree towards an
international public registry, is important if the benefits of mandatory
company disclosure are to outweigh the costs.

64

Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 4.
Id.
66
Biedermann, supra note 3, at 89-91 (discussing the plans outlined by some G8
countries with respect to a public registry); see also Fabrice Demarigny and
Christophe Clerc, Transparency Directive Assessment Report: Executive summary
and
possible
improvements,
VI
MAZARS
(2009),
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/docs/transparency/reportapplication_summary_en.pdf.
67
Transparency & Trust: Enhancing the Transparency of UK Company Ownership
and Increasing Trust in UK Business, DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS INNOVATION AND
SKILLS
27,
§
2.23
(2013),
https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/212079/bis-13-959-transparency-and-trust-enhancing-the-transparency-ofuk-company-ownership-and-increaing-trust-in-uk-business.pdf.
65
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EU TRANSPARENCY DIRECTIVE AND OWNERSHIP
DISCLOSURE
The European Union (EU) was created through the Maastricht Treaty

of 1992, also known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Twelve
original “High Contracting Parties” (Member Nations) signed the TEU
onFebruary 7, 1992, and the TEU entered into force on November 1, 1993.68
The TEU also facilitated the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union,
which led to the creation of the euro currency in January 1999.69 However,
the European Communities,70 consisting of various EU countries, existed as
early as the late 1970s, well before the creation of the European Union.
The EU forged the pathway for a mandatory ownership disclosure
scheme beginning in 1988 via the “Major Holdings Disclosure Directive.”71
Council Directive 88/627/EEC imposed an obligation to disclose major
shareholdings when they were acquired and when they were disposed of.72
However, due to certain limitations in its application, the Major Holdings
Disclosure Directive was repealed and replaced in 2004 by Directive
2004/109/EC (the “Transparency Directive”).73 The Transparency Directive
was later amended in 2013 by Directive 2013/50/EU to take into account
several improvements such as issuer obligations, and to make regulated
markets more attractive to small and medium-sized businesses.74 Under the

68

See Civitas, EU Factsheet: Treaty of Maastricht, CIVITAS.ORG.UK (2014),
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSTREAT/TR3.php [hereinafter EU Factsheet]
69
Id.; Timeline: the unfolding eurozone crisis, BBC NEWS.COM (June 13, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business13856580 (citing January 1, 1999 as the date
when the euro currency ‘officially came into existence’).
70
Greek
Profile
Timeline,
BBC.COM
(August
11,
2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17373216 (noting the existence of the
European Communities, which was subsequently subsumed by the European Union
and Greece, an EU country as being one of its members in 1981).
71
Schouten, supra note 12, at 132 (citing Council Directive 88/627/EEC, On the
Information to be Published when a Major Holding in a Listed Company is Acquired
or Disposed Of, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62 (1988)); Holger Fleischer and Klaus Ulrich
Schmolke, The reform of the Transparency Directive: Minimum or Full
Harmonisation of Ownership Disclosure?, 12(1) EUROPEAN BUS. ORG. L.REV., 121145 (2011)
(discussing the ‘Transparency Directive 1988’).
72
Schouten, supra note 12, at 132; Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 17.
73
Schouten, supra note 12, at 132 (citing the Transparency Directive); see also
Fleischer and Schmolke, supra note 75, at 125-126 (discussing the ‘Transparency
Directive 2004’).
74
See generally Directive 2013/50/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 22 October 2013 amending Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation
to Information About Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted to Trading on a
Regulated Market, Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or
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Transparency Directive, persons or entities who “hold or have access to
voting rights should disclose their major holdings in listed companies”75 in
the sense that they must provide “timely information about the acquisition or
disposal of voting rights of listed companies… based on thresholds starting at
5%, continuing at intervals of 5% until 30% of voting rights.”76 In addition,
the Transparency Directive requires both periodic and ad hoc reporting. For
example, Article 12(2) requires that, when there is a change in a major
shareholding, the issuer must file a notification within four days of when the
shareholding falls or exceeds the thresholds in Article 9.77 Subsequently, the
listing company must inform the public within three days of receiving the
notice of the change.78 The notification requirement also applies to various
classes of shares such as warrants, convertible bonds and some derivatives.79
According to Schouten, the disclosure regime of the Transparency
Directive improves the transparency of voting structure as well as any
changes in such voting structure, which may signal a potential shift in
corporate control. 80 The Transparency Directive regime also enhances
transparency of important capital movements such as economic interests,
trading interests, and the size of the free float.81 In addition, Schouten argues
that the Transparency Directive plays an important role in improving
corporate governance by allowing investors to anticipate and reduce agency
costs, and by addressing other agency-related problems.82
In 2009, Mazars published a report on the findings of an assessment
of the EU Transparency Directive. The study was part of the European
Commission’s obligations under Article 33 of the Transparency Directive.83
Mazars’ methodology consisted of online questionnaires (with a 12% global
response rate), shareholder interviews, financial reporting compliance

admitted to trading and Commission Directive 2007/14/EC laying down detailed
rules for the implementation of certain provisions of Directive 2004/109/EC.
75
Schouten, supra note 12, at 132.
76
Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 17 (citing Article 9 of the Transparency Directive).
77
Id.
78
Id. (citing Article 9 and Article 12(2) of the Transparency Directive).
79
Id.
80
Schouten, supra note 12, at 134-148.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 148-156 (discussing agency costs and problems in relation to lack of
transparency of beneficial owners); Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 7-8, 12-14, and 26
(discussing horizontal and vertical agency cost issues).
83
Demarigny and Clerc, supra note 70, at VI (discussing harmonization of
transparency requirements, particularly under EU Directive 2004/109/EC
(Transparency Directive).
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reviews and legal implementation reviews.84 The study included feedback
from fifteen EU Member States and six non-EU Members, including the
U.S., Japan, China, India, Hong Kong and Switzerland. 85 Stakeholder
representatives in the study included issuers of shares and debt or other
securities, institutional investors, retail investors associations, financial
analysts and financial intermediaries.86
While a strong majority of respondents (65%) reported that the
Transparency Directive was clear and met the objectives of “providing
accurate, comprehensive, and timely information to the market,”87 only 32%
of non-EU stakeholders had sufficient knowledge, interests, or understanding
of the obligations under the Transparency Directive.88 And only 16% of nonEU nations “believe that the Directive provides sufficient clarity and
predictability.”89 Considering the non-EU nations in the study are some of the
largest and most developed economies in the world, it does not bode well for
the EU’s desire to convince the world of the attractiveness of the single
market, particularly in terms of transparency.90 Respondents who expressed
positive views about the Directive creating a favorable impression of the
single market consisted of 66% of non-EU institutional investors.91
Interestingly enough, in contrast to Schouten’s views, the study
results related to information and notification of major holdings under the
Transparency Directive were “the most problematic according to the
perceptions of stakeholders and the legal assessment of the legal operation in
Member States.”92 While 78% of financial analysts and institutional investors
found the disclosure of major holdings useful for investment purposes and
58% found the disclosure and notification obligations to not impose an
unreasonable burden,93 a detailed analysis of responses found several areas of
concern with respect to disclosure, notification, and enforcement.
First, many EU member states have adopted more stringent
ownership disclosure thresholds, leading to a lack of harmonization in
84

Demarigny and Clerc, supra note 70, at VI.
Id.
86
Id. It is important to note that the Report does not specify the total number of
individual respondents in the sample size and the total respondents across all methods
of collecting the data.
87
Id. at VII.
88
Id. at XVII.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at XI.
93
Id.
85
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implementing the Transparency Directive. 94 This lack of harmonization
means that the notification process is neither simpler nor less burdensome
under the Transparency Directive. .95 Second, respondents reported that the
unclear provisions of the Transparency Directive, combined with financial
innovation such as “empty voting,” lending of voting rights, cash-settled
equity swaps and cash-settled contracts,96 “allows certain market players to
circumvent transparency requirements,” 97 thus making the Directive “too
rule-based and not sufficiently principle-based.”98
Compared with Mazars’ study, Vermeulen’s 2012 comparative
analysis of five jurisdictions with respect to their disclosure of control
structures and beneficial owners provides insight into whether each
jurisdiction had sufficient transparency of beneficial ownership by
international standards. In his study, Vermeulen includes Italy as the EU
representative country implementing Transparency Directive. As to
disclosure of control structures and transparency of beneficial disclosure,
Italy deviates from the Transparency Directive’s minimum threshold of 5%
for the first threshold reporting requirements.99 In Italy, the first threshold is
2%, followed by 5%, and then increments of 5% up to 95% of holding.100
However, Vermeulen indicates that countries such as Italy and Malaysia
“have taken or are taking measures to amend the rules”101 by imposing a
stricter threshold towards the international norm of 5% as the minimum
starting threshold for reporting beneficial ownership. In addition, Italy’s
securities regulator, CONSOB, appears to be moving towards a stricter
disclosure regime. For example, CONSOB includes cash-settled equity
derivatives in its reporting requirement, and mandates that the ultimate
controlling person shall notify the major holding within five days of reaching
a particular ownership threshold.102 CONSOB would ultimately verify the

94

Id.; see also Fleischer and Schmolke, supra note 75, at 125-126 (discussing
harmonization issues related to the Transparency Directive in general).
95
Demarigny and Clerc, supra note 70, at XI; See also Fleischer and Schmolke,
supra note 75.
96
Demarigny and Clerc, supra note 70, at XI.
97
Id.
98
Id.; see also id. at XII-XIV (on recommendations for dealing with some of the
above-mentioned issues).
99
Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 20.
100
Id. (citing the Italian Consolidated Law on Finance and the CONSOB, the Italian
securities and regulatory agency).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 21.
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reported information, post the information on its website, and ensure the data
is publicly accessible.103
In addition to the Mazars and Vermeulen studies, the 2013 Global
Witness Report on G8 countries and hidden company ownership discovered
that a public registry is an important criteria in assessing whether a country
has high transparency of beneficial ownership disclosure. At the time of the
Global Witness Report, nearly all G8 nations, including Italy, Germany,
France and the United Kingdom, did not have a publicly accessible registry
of company beneficial owners, though such data appeared to be retrievable
privately or through a private registry.104
In addition, Computershare’s 2015 market analysis report on
transparency of share ownership in six European nations105 is worth noting,
especially since transparency is defined in terms of whether an issuer (not a
beneficial owner or shareholder) has visibility to the underlying beneficial
owner

of

shares

or

can

demand

such

disclosure.

According

to

Computershare’s study, by international standards, France, Germany, United
Kingdom and Sweden are rated as being “highly transparent market[s] of
share ownership for issuers,”106 with issuers having a high degree of visibility
into the beneficial owners and their shares. In each of these countries,
visibility of beneficial ownership can be obtained through a shared register or
through disclosure procedures under the law, as long as the shareholders are
NOBOs (non-objecting beneficial owners). Comparatively, in Italy, issuers
only have full transparency of investors at times of certain corporate actions
such as annual general meetings.107 However, Italian law does give a right to
issuers to request that intermediaries disclose beneficial owners, as long as
there are NOBOs and the issuer has adopted enabling by-laws allowing such
disclosure.108 Finally, Spain is largely classified as a bearer shares market
(versus a registered shares market) with a “moderate level of transparency of
share ownership for issuers due to the disclosure of Spanish intermediaries’
client account holding”.109 Visibility of local investors is also higher than of
foreign investors. At the same time, Article §497 of the Corporation Act
103

Id.
Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 6.
105
See generally Corney et al., supra note 56 (the six European nations included
France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Spain, and Sweden).
106
Id. at 14-24 (analysing the European countries).
107
Id. at 17.
108
Id.
109
Id.
104

140

Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.

Vol. XVI

gives issuers the right to request disclosure of beneficial ownership and,
under Article §524 of the Corporation Act, “all intermediaries representing
investors at shareholder meetings must disclose their clients’ voting
instructions, and number of shares voted, to the issuer.”110
On balance, it appears that each of the jurisdictions discussed above
has addressed the issue of transparency of beneficial ownership to some
degree and that the EU Transparency Directive has contributed to an
environment of greater disclosure of beneficial ownership. At the same time,
according to the above-mentioned studies, there are some remaining issues
and areas worth further research and reform since member nations do not
have a fully harmonised procedure regarding transparency of beneficial
ownership.111 These will be discussed in a consolidated manner in Part VI of
this article.112
III.

U.S. INITIATIVES ON BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP
TRANSPARENCY
In the United States, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the

Securities Exchange Act) is the primary legislation that governs the
disclosure and reporting of beneficial ownership and control structures for
listed companies. In addition, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of
2010 became effective as of 2014, and deals with foreign accounts in
financial institutions with the goal of discovering the identities of anonymous
beneficiaries of corporate vehicles. Finally and most recently, the United
States seeks to fulfill the pledge of the 2013 G8 Summit’s action plan on
beneficial

ownership

disclosure

by

passing

the

currently

debated

Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act (the
“Levin Bill” or “ITLEAA”).
A.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934113

Under Section 13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, the initial threshold for reporting is set at 5% ownership in a listed
company, consistent with the EU Transparency Directive and international
110

Id. at 22.
See generally Fleischer and Schmolke, supra note 75 (discussing whether full
harmonization of the Transparency Directive is a necessary next step or even a viable
option, weighing the pros and cons of such a move by the EU).
112
See Part VI of this article (Outstanding Issues and Impact on Corporate
Performance).
113
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78(a) (2006); see also Securities and
Exchange Commission, Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements and Securitybased Swaps (SEC Release No. 34-64628, June 8, 2011).
111
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norms. A person who is the beneficial owner of more than 5% of equity
securities must disclose information related to such beneficial ownership
within ten days of reaching the threshold.114 Rule 13d-3(a) defines beneficial
owners as “persons who may, directly or indirectly, vote or dispose or direct
the voting or disposition of a voting class of equity securities under section
12.” 115 Furthermore, Section 13(d) and Schedule 13D require that the
beneficial owner disclose extensive personal and professional information in
regards to the purchased equity securities.116 Section 13(d)(2) and Rule 13d2(a) impose a further obligation on the beneficial owner to report any
material changes through a Schedule 13D amended filing. Under Rule 13d2(a), a material change is deemed to be “the acquisition or disposition of
beneficial ownership of securities in an amount equal to 1% or more of a
class of securities,”117 though the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
reserves the right to consider lesser acquisitions and dispositions as material
based on facts and circumstances.118
One of the unique and important features of the Securities Exchange
Act is that Rule 13d-3 allows for a case-by-case determination of whether a
person is deemed to be a beneficial owner.119 This allows proportionality,
flexibility and a “market practice”120 approach in handling and integrating
new financial arrangements under the existing law that may run afoul of the
Securities Exchange Act, such as cash settled equity directives and securitybased swaps.121 In addition, the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis
and Retrieval System (EDGAR), stores, reports and analyses data regarding
beneficial ownership and control information filed with the SEC.122 On most
counts, EDGAR is publicly available.

114

Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 21.
Id. at 22.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 21 (citing Securities and Exchange Commission, Beneficial Ownership
Reporting Requirements and Security-based Swaps (SEC Release N0. 34-64628,
June 8, 2011)).
120
Id. at 21, 26.
121
Id. at 22 (discussing section 766 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, which amended the Securities Exchange Act to add section
13(o) to deal with security-based swaps).
122
Id.
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Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act of 2010123

In addition to the Securities Exchange Act, the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act of 2010 (FATCA), which came into effect in 2014, aims at
discovering the identities of anonymous beneficiaries of corporate vehicles
by targeting financial institutions and foreign accounts.124 FATCA imposes
an obligation on foreign U.S. persons and foreign entities to report any and
all substantial U.S. ownership, 125 through shell companies and corporate
vehicles, for instance, 126 to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and to foreign
financial services. According to Greenberg, “the rules are intended to provide
reporting both on accounts held directly by individuals and on interests in
accounts held by shell entities for the benefit of U.S. persons.”127 In addition,
FATCA intends to “weed out” U.S. persons who may be hiding as
anonymous beneficiaries of corporate vehicles.128 Failure to comply with the
reporting requirements of FATCA subject any non-complying institutions
and beneficial owners to an almost 30% withholding tax.129
C.

Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement
Assistance Act of 2013130

A final noteworthy U.S. initiative towards mandating beneficial
ownership

disclosure

is

the

Incorporation

Transparency

and

Law

Enforcement Assistance Act of 2013 (the “Levin Bill” or “ITLEAA”). The
purpose of ITLEAA is “to ensure that owners and formation agents who for
non-publicly held companies in the United States disclose the beneficial
owners of those companies.”131 The reason for such mandatory disclosure is
to prevent criminally minded individuals from creating and using corporate
vehicles in the United States for illicit purposes, such as money laundering,

See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Dec. 19,
2014),
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-TaxCompliance-Act-FATCA.
124
See id.
125
Biedermann, supra note 5, at 82 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1473(2)(A) (2010), where
“substantial United States Owner” means ownership of “more than 10 percent of the
stock” in a corporation, rights to “more than 10 percent of the profits interests or
capital interests” of a partnership, or indirectly or directly holding “10 percent
beneficial interest” in a trust).
126
Id., at 81.
127
Itai Greenberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304,
334 (2012).
128
Biedermann, supra note 5, at 83.
129
Id., at 82 (discussing relevant provisions of FATCA).
130
S. 569, 111th Cong. §2(3) (2009) (as introduced by Sen. Carl Levin, Mar. 11,
2009).
131
Kalant, supra note 3, at 1054.
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tax evasion, and other illicit uses with shell companies.132 ITLEAA would
impose an obligation on all U.S. states to maintain an accurate and updated
list of all beneficial owners of corporations and LLCs created in the state, and
to provide that list to law enforcement and others by subpoena or written
request.133
Three key features of ITLEAA are noteworthy and have led to
controversial debates about whether it would effectively address the issues
surrounding lack of transparency of beneficial ownership. First, ITLEAA
would place a heavy burden on states and formation agents to collect and
maintain an up-to-date list of all beneficial owners.134 In addition, states must
also provide an annual report that updates the state’s list of beneficial
owners.135 Second, as part of maintaining such list, ITLEAA requires the state
to “maintain a copy of driver’s licenses of all such beneficial owners.”136 For
foreign-held corporations in the U.S., ITLEAA requires that a formation
agent certify the foreign application for incorporation in a U.S. state before
the state will formally and legally accept the company.137 As part of the
certification process, beneficial owners of a foreign-held corporation or LLC
must provide “a photocopy of the page of the government-issued passport on
which a photograph of the beneficial owner appears.”138
ITLEAA imposes, arguably, onerous civil and criminal penalties
on individuals and entities for failure to comply with the reporting
requirements. For example, failure to provide correct beneficial ownership
information or knowingly falsifying such information can result in a
maximum fine of USD $10,000 and up to three years in prison.139
D.

External Studies of U.S. Beneficial Ownership
Transparency

The reports from external studies mainly center on an evaluation of
current law and practices, namely the Securities Exchange Act. According to
Vermeulen’s comparative study of beneficial ownership disclosure across
five jurisdictions, the United States “has clear, accessible, and also flexible
132

Id. at 1053-1054.
Verret, supra note 51, at 859; S. 569, 111th Cong. §3(a)(1)(a)(1)(D) (2009).
134
See Id., at 859 (listing several burdens on states and formation agents); see also
Kalant, supra note 3, at 1056 (stating “how and to whom the ownership information
would be provided”).
135
Verret, supra note 51, at 859.
136
Id.
137
Kalant, supra note 3, at 1056-1057.
138
Id., at 1057; see also S. 569, 111th Cong. §3(a)(1)(a)(2)(B) (2009).
139
Verret, supra note 51, at 859; S. 569, 111th Cong. §3(a)(1)(b) (2009).
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rules that provide transparency in different layers of shareholding.” 140 It
includes web-based access to EDGAR that “provides detailed and up-to-date
information about listed companies, making it possible for companies to
build a reputation as a competent and reliable investment opportunity.”141
Somewhat contrary to Vermeulen’s assessment, Computershare’s
2015 market analysis of transparency of share ownership (beneficial
ownership) based on international standards rated the United States as
providing “low transparency of share ownership for issuers due to the
depository structure.”142 The U.S. central securities depository (CSD), the
Depository Trust Company (DTC), places legal ownership in the name of its
nominee, Cede & Co., which means that DTC-eligible U.S. securities “are
registered to Cede & Co, significantly reducing the direct visibility of
investors on the share register.”143 Issuers can request the DTC to provide a
list of beneficial owners under the law, but investors who hold securities
through intermediaries may refuse to have their identity disclosed.144 This is
the case for institutional investors who are more commonly objecting
beneficial owners (OBOs).145 Furthermore, stock exchange-mandated fees for
disclosure make the process of seeking beneficial ownership transparency
cost-prohibitive.
Given that the FATCA was only recently implemented and it is not
certain whether the ITLEAA will pass congressional approval, it is too early
to assess the impact of both of these initiatives on company ownership
disclosure. In addition, both FATCA and ITLEAA have garnered their share
of criticism, which will be discussed in a consolidated manner in Part VI of
this article.146
IV.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AT MANDATING
OWNERSHIP DISCLOSURE
Apart from the EU and U.S. initiatives in mandating disclosure of

beneficial ownership, this section analyzes other international efforts aimed at
creating greater transparency of beneficial ownership. While the issue of tax
140

Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 29 (praising the flexibility and proportionality
approach in the U.S. that allows for greater adaptability to technological evolution
and further financial innovation with respect to tracking beneficial owners).
141
Id.
142
Corney et al., supra note 56, at 28.
143
Id.
144
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See Part VI of this article (Outstanding Issues and Impact on Corporate
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havens is not extensively discussed in this article, it is important to keep in
mind that, according to several reports and studies, the largest culprits of
avoiding disclosure of beneficial ownership requirements are off-shore tax
havens such as the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands and
Singapore.147
A.

OECD Model Tax Convention

Despite criticisms to the contrary, 148 the OECD Model Tax
Convention on Income and Capital (OECD Model Tax Convention) is
regarded as providing “the prevailing international norms for a valid
information request” between countries with respect to proliferating company
information in foreign jurisdictions.149
Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention allows authorities to
pursue claims against anonymous beneficiaries by placing a request for
exchange of information with another treaty member state. The information
request is valid so long as it is “foreseeably relevant” to the state’s domestic
tax laws.150 However, Article 26 also provides for several exceptions through
which a treaty member state can refuse to comply with the request for
exchange of information, including requests that: (a) would require the state
to take actions or administrative measures that are contrary to state practice;
(b) supply information that would not ordinarily be supplied under the laws
of that state; and (c) disclose information that would contravene the state’s
public policy.151 Because the language of these exceptions is so broad and all
encompassing, it is difficult to understand how the OECD Model Tax
Convention can serve as an effective, enforcement-based procedure for
regulating the capture, analysis, reporting, and public transparency of
beneficial ownership disclosure.152
147

Biedermann, supra note 5, at 87 (citing the Int’l Consortium of Investigative
Journalists (ICIJ), Offshore Leaks Database (2013), available at http://
offshoreleaks.icij.org/search); see also Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 7-8
(listing tax havens where public registries of beneficial ownership do not exist).
148
See Lee Sheppard, Don't Sign OECD Model Tax Treaties!, TAX JUSTICE
NETWORK (May 31, 2013), http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2013/05/lee-shepparddont-sign-oecd-model-tax.html.
149
Biedermann, supra note 5, at 88
150
Id., at 78 (citing to OECD, Update to Article 26 of the OECD Model Tax
Convention and its Commentary, 1 (2012),http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-taxinformation/120718_Article%2026-ENG_no%20cover%20(2).pdf); see also OLIVER
R. HOOR, THE OECD TAX CONVENTION: A COMPREHENSIVE TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
233 (Legitech, 2010).
151
Biedermann, supra note 5, at 88.
152
Id. at 79 (discussing other provisions of the OECD Model Tax Convention and its
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The leaders at the 2013 G8 Summit did support a revision to the
OECD Model Tax Convention to require “an automatic exchange of
information”153 to obtain information more quickly and effectively on the
beneficial ownership of “shell companies, special purpose companies, and
trust arrangements.”154 However, only eight nations are obligated to abide by
the G8 Principles. While these nations do have strong influential reputations,
the Convention has yet to be revised, and even if revised, it would have to be
ratified and implemented by a significant portion of the signing member
states. It is unlikely that member states would support an automatic exchange
of information as this may tread on issues of state sovereignty and more
importantly, because it would reduce the enormous benefits and competitive
advantages that some jurisdictions likely enjoy from not disclosing beneficial
ownership and control structures to the public.
B. Transparency of Beneficial Ownership in Asian Countries
Computershare’s March 2015 report on the results of a market
analysis of transparency of share ownership to issuers focused, in part, on
Asian countries including Australia, China, Hong Kong, India, and Japan.155
In addition, Vermeulen’s 2012 comparative analysis of five jurisdictions and
their beneficial disclosure regimes included China, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. 156 Moreover, Global Witness’ 2013 report on hidden company
ownership briefly reviewed that state of public transparency into hidden
company ownership in Hong Kong and Singapore.157
By international standards, Australia is viewed as having a high level
of transparency of shareholder information for issuers.158 This is because
Australia’s CSD, CHESS, is structured based on direct legal title. In addition,
laws in Australia give legal rights to listed companies (issuers) to obtain
information on their beneficial owners.159 A share register, consisting of two
sub-registers, is updated and provided to the issuer at the end of each day.
The complete share register is available for public inspection. With respect to
153

2013 Lough Erne G8 Leaders' Communiqué, GOV.UK 6-7 (June 18, 2013),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/20777
1/Lough_Erne_2013_G8_Leaders_Communique.pdf.
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Biedermann, supra note 5, at 88.
155
See Corney et al., supra note 56.
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Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 25-27 (discussing disclosure of beneficial ownership
with respect to control structures, control-enhancing mechanisms and arrangements
and corporate vehicles).
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Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 5-6.
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Corney et al., supra note 56, at 4.
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nominee accounts with an intermediary, issuers can demand that the nominee
disclose beneficial owners under Section 672 of the Corporations Act of
2001.160
While China is still considered to be a primarily domestic market
with “government entities holding a controlling interest in many public
companies,” 161 by international standards, Computershare’s study grades
China as “a highly transparent market of share ownership for issuers.”162 This
is because all shares are registered in a state-controlled central registrar where
issuers are able to receive a list of all shareholders “on a monthly basis free of
charge.” 163 According to the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Securities (China Securities Law), a listed company must disclose detailed
information about beneficial ownership (those holding 5% or more) and
voting rights both in semi-annual and annual reports.164 Under Article 3 of the
Administrative Measures on Information Disclosure by Listed Companies,
there is an affirmative obligation on company directors to ensure the accuracy
and completeness of any information disclosed, which is further reinforced
by the duty of company directors to sign and certify regular reports under
Article 24. 165 Moreover, listed companies must report information of
beneficial ownership and control structure to their respective stock exchanges
as well as to the China Securities Regulatory Commission.166 Thus, China
requires a great deal of disclosure from companies, which seems appropriate
given how many companies are state-controlled.
Similar to China, India is considered to be a predominantly domestic
market.

167

By international standards, India is a “particularly high

transparency market of share ownership for issuers.”168 Share ownership can
be in the form of registered and certified shares listed on a share register, or
held in a dematerialized form by an intermediary in two central depository
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Id. at 6.
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Id. (discussing the differences in B-shares and Qualified Foreign Institutional
Investor (QFII) scheme specifically for foreign investment in China).
163
Id. (noting that, with respect to QFII foreign shareholders, the registered owner is
more often a financial intermediary so the issuer “has no mechanism to obtain the
beneficial ownership beyond this level”).
164
Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 25.
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Id.
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Id. at 26.
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Corney et al., supra note 56, at 10.
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Id. (noting also that India, similar to China, has implemented the Qualified
Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program specifically for foreign investors in
India).
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services.169 Indian law gives beneficial owners the legal rights in the shares
purchased, without the need for intermediaries to have legal rights.170 This
allows for “direct visibility and a direct legal relationship between the issuers
and their beneficial owners…”171 Furthermore, under the Companies Bill of
2012, a full list of beneficial owners is filed with the stock exchange, after
each annual general meeting, and with the Registrar of Companies.172 Anyone
can access the list of beneficial owners upon reasonable notice and payment
of a nominal fee.173
However, since India has adopted the Qualified Foreign Institutional
Investor programme (QFII), there is less visibility into foreign beneficial
ownership.174 Both India and China would do well to reconsider the need for
a QFII regime as their markets develop, especially if they wish to reach their
full potential. In the alternative, changes to the QFII regime to allow for
greater access and visibility into foreign beneficial ownership may be
warranted, as seems to be the case concerning the legislative intent
underlying U.S. ITLEAA, discussed in Part IV(c) of this article.
Japan is considered as providing “moderate to low transparency of
share ownership” to issuers.175 First, while investors can directly register
their shares with the issuer’s share register, this is not common practice.176
Most investors are institutional investors who use nominee accounts, such as
custodial or omnibus accounts, through intermediaries.177 Only the nominee
or omnibus account information (i.e., intermediary account) is listed on the
issuer’s share register as the legal shareholder, thus precluding disclosure of
beneficial ownership. 178 While issuers do receive information about all
nominee accounts from Japan’s Security Depository Center (SDC) twice per
year and the account details may disclose the underlying beneficial owner,
this practice is not consistent, 179 and high fees preclude more frequent
updates and reporting requests.180 Second, similar to China and India but
without having a formal QFII program, securities for foreign investors in
169
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Japan are held and “recorded through a foreign intermediary, who holds legal
title to the shares,”181 thus reducing visibility to foreign beneficial owners.
Japan’s beneficial ownership disclosure regime could certainly benefit from
some reforms.
Similar to India, Hong Kong is a “highly transparent market of share
ownership for issuers,”182 primarily because Hong Kong law supports an
issuer’s right to disclosure of beneficial ownership in listed companies.183
Investors can hold shares directly through a certified form for registered
shares or via an intermediary in Hong Kong’s CCASS, a transparent
depository that permits public disclosure on Hong Kong’s stock exchange.
With respect to issuers’ right of disclosure, under Section 329 of the
Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap 571), issuers can compel the
intermediary to disclose the underlying beneficial owners, even those who are
represented in a chain of beneficial owners. 184 In a further step towards
transparency, issuers also notify the stock exchange and the Securities and
Futures Commission of any disclosure requests,185 the findings of which are
publicly available on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange website.
Finally, Vermeulen’s study reveals Malaysia as “offering a high level
of disclosure and reporting”186 with a beneficial ownership disclosure regime
that is “very extended and detailed”187 and includes “easy electronic access to
ownership and control information.”188 Minority investors and the public can
find information about shareholders “as far as the final layer of beneficial
owners,”189 as long as the shareholder is a “substantial shareholder,” meaning
that the shareholder “holds, either directly or indirectly, at least 5% of the
outstanding shares.”190
Under the Malaysian Companies Act (amended in 2006), companies
have several obligations with respect to disclosure of beneficial ownership.
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Id. at 8; Cf. Global Witness Report, supra note 8, at 6 (stating that Hong Kong
does not have a register [public or private] of beneficial ownership).
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Corney et, al,, supra note 56, at 8.
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Id. (citing to Section 330 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance and noting that
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Under Section 158, companies must keep and maintain a detailed register of
their members and the number of shares they hold, which is public and is
“open to inspection by any member free of charge.”191 In addition to the
general shareholder register, Section 69C requires companies to maintain a
separate register containing only the substantial shareholders, including any
changes in shareholding position as well as a detailed explanation of the
change.192 Moreover, a similar obligation rests with the shareholder, who has
a duty to notify the company when, if ever, he or she became a substantial
shareholder.193
Under the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad
(Listing Requirements), a listed company must: (i) announce notices related
to substantial shareholdings;194 (ii) announce any changes of control in the
company;195 and (iii) identify substantial shareholders in its annual report196
along with other details regarding the substantial shareholders and direct
interests. These company announcements are submitted to and available
through Bursa Malaysia Listing Information Network (Bursa LINK), which
enables providers, investors and regulators “to instantly obtain information
about beneficial ownership and control structures.”197
A third and important aspect of Malaysia’s beneficial ownership
disclosure regime is the Securities Industry Central Depositories Act 1991
(SICDA). Under SICDA, every securities account must be opened “in the
name of the beneficial owner… or in the name of the authorized nominee.”198
Where the account is opened in the name of the authorized nominee, SICDA
Rule 25.02B(2) requires that the authorized nominee (intermediary) stipulate
the identity of the beneficial owner and relevant details about the beneficial
owner. Further information can also be requested by numerous regulatory
agencies. The authorized nominee can face revocation to act as nominee
account holder as well as suspension from all managed accounts for failure to
comply with the disclosure requirements. Furthermore, the nominee
companies and custodians who operate omnibus accounts are also required to

191

Id. (citing to Section 160(2) of the Malaysian Companies Act).
Id. at 24 (discussing Section 69L of the Malaysian Companies Act).
193
Id. (citing to Section 69E of the Malaysian Companies Act).
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Id. (citing Paragraph 9.19(17) and (18) of Malaysia’s Listing Requirements).
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Id. (citing Paragraph 9.19(41) of Malaysia’s Listing Requirements).
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Id. (citing Paragraph 23, Appendix 9C of Malaysia’s Listing Requirements).
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Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 25.
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Id. (citing Section 25(4) of the Securities Industry (Central Depositories Act) 1991
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disclose beneficial owners199 upon request by the Securities Commission of
Malaysia, subject to criteria under Section 45 where disclosure is permitted
without violating the beneficial owner’s consent.200
As compared with many jurisdictions, Malaysia does, indeed, appear
to have one of the most comprehensive and detailed beneficial ownership
disclosure schemes. Some might even say that this scheme is too complex
and burdensome on the listed company and beneficial owners. This leads to a
larger question of how strict or how flexible should a beneficial ownership
disclosure regime be. While this is not the direct focus of this article, in the
case of Malaysia, Vermeulen points out that before the 1997-1998 Asian
financial crisis, Malaysia had very simple and basic rules on beneficial
ownership.201 In response to the Asian financial crisis, Malaysia went to the
opposite extreme and enacted detailed, extensive and rather strict laws, which
may have restored investor confidence for a short time but also “negatively
affected Malaysia’s reputation and attractiveness… to foreign investors.”202
This led to Malaysia’s initiative to implement reforms in 2005 to “relax and
streamline the regime.”203 Whether those efforts are successful remains to be
seen. One could argue that Malaysia’s current regime faces some of the same
issues as other jurisdictions, where there is no public register of beneficial
ownership combined with a cost-heavy and resource-intensive compliance
and enforcement system.204
V.

OUTSTANDING ISSUES, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS,
AND IMPACT ON CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
A.

Outstanding Issues and Policy Recommendations

From the above analysis, there is some room for relief and
celebration in knowing that jurisdictions are concerned with the impacts of
hidden company ownership, and serious about implementing measures to
increase transparency of the disclosure and findings of company beneficial
ownership. However, as we look back on the commitments at the 2013 G8
Summit, the issue has not yet reached effective resolution. In the wake of
ever-increasing innovation in the financial sector coupled with the
199
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imaginative creation corporate vehicles for personal as well as sometimes
illicit gain, outstanding issues remain.
1. Defining Ownership
The first and most foundational issue is defining terms such as
‘ownership,’ ‘beneficial ownership,’ ‘control’ and ‘transparency,’ as they
relate to issues of implementing an effective disclosure and transparency
regime for hidden company ownership. As discussed in the preliminary
sections of this article, there are myriad definitions of ownership, but it is
most commonly referred to as beneficial ownership. However, there are
multiple definitions of beneficial ownership, such as the potentially
contradictory definitions in the U.S. Securities Exchange Act, which focuses
on ‘voting power’ and ‘investment power,’ as compared to U.S. proposed
ITLEAA, which focuses on the degree of ‘control’ of a shareholder. 205
Another example is the EU Transparency Directive’s use of ‘power to
exercise dominant influence or control’ versus Malaysia’s use of ‘substantial
shareholder.’ Moreover, while the majority of jurisdictions have adopted the
international norm of 5% initial threshold as the mark of “beneficial
ownership,” Russia uses “more than 1% of shares in a company” as the
delimiter on whether a shareholder is important enough to review the share
register or vote. Perhaps it is time to establish a more consistent, cross-border
definition for the problem that mandatory company ownership disclosure is
intended to solve, based on the goals to be obtained by mandating such
information.
Vermeulen argues that a disclosure and enforcement regime could be
devised to target different types of beneficial owners, such as: “(1) passive
beneficial owners who are only interested in a company’s share price, (2)
beneficial owners who monitor the performance of listed companies and
initiate dialogues with management, and (3) beneficial owners that seek to
acquire control over a listed company.”206 If such distinctions do exist, and
shareholders do have different functions and rationales for acquiring equity
securities, it makes sense to adopt a clear, comprehensive, yet concise
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Verret, supra note 51, at 863 (discussing a major criticism of the Levin Bill in
mixing concepts of ownership and control: “One would be a focus on owners, the
other a focus merely on those individuals or owners who actually control the
company. The latter offers a clearer view of those who might be using the entity for
illegal purposes, and yet, defining control…is a particularly difficult task”).
206
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definition of ownership to accommodate these functions, and to harmonise
these terms and definitions across jurisdictions.
In addition, by reviewing the statutory interpretation of nearly all
definitions of “beneficial ownership,” one of the main concerns is to manage
those who would be considered inside blockholders with the intention to
control the company. Delineating the definition of beneficial ownership down
to purposeful definitions would certainly reduce the costs of gathering and
verifying information, enhance the ability for generating useful reports on
company ownership, increase the likelihood that law enforcement and
regulatory agencies can intervene where illicit activity occurs, and more
importantly, provide transparency of communication and decision-making.
2. Defining Transparency
A second outstanding yet foundational issue is the need for greater
clarity and consensus on the definition of transparency, especially with
respect to the level of transparency necessary to have an effective beneficial
ownership disclosure and enforcement regime.
Disclosure and transparency, as used in this article, can have different
meanings. At the national level, companies and regulatory agencies may
compel disclosure of beneficial ownership information; however, whether
such information is transparent to the degree necessary to prevent the issue of
hidden company ownership is a different matter. As analysed in Part II(C) of
this article, transparency, to date consists of at least three different
components: (i) transparency to the issuer through required disclosures under
national law by investors who reach certain ownership thresholds; (ii)
transparency to the issuer through disclosures under national law by
intermediaries who hold securities for investors and who must respond to
formal disclosure requests; and (iii) transparency to the general public,
international regulatory agencies and law enforcement about beneficial
owners in companies.207
Moreover, because companies today operate in a global economy, the
degree of transparency required by bodies of international trade, such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO), must be taken into account. The WTO’s
glossary defines transparency as “the degree to which trade policies and
practices, and the process by which they are established, are open and

207
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predictable.”208 In effect, according to Martinez-Fraga, a general principle of
transparency in international law “suggest[s], if not altogether commands… a
universal absence of concealment.”209
By applying the above definitions to beneficial ownership disclosure
policies and practices, as well as the process by which they are determined, it
is clear that the international community has a long way to go with respect to
meeting the high standards of transparency indicated above, especially in
terms of predictability.210 At the same time, transparency will not create a
climate of openness and predictability if there is asymmetrical information or
policies and rules that nobody understands,211 especially those tasked with
complying with such rules, analysing the data, or enforcing the laws that
require disclosure of the information. Under this understanding of
transparency, studies show that most countries have national legislation
aimed at disclosure of beneficial ownership information by investors and
intermediaries to the issuer. Such disclosures are subject to a formal request
and sometimes at a high cost, and only by the issuer to the national regulatory
and monitoring agencies. What is missing is a consistent and up-to-date
national and international public registry of beneficial company ownership.
The May 2014 G20 Position Paper highlights several advantages of a
public registry of beneficial company ownership as a means to accomplish
transparency goals, including but not limited to: (i) reducing the red-tape in
law enforcement in conducting cross-border investigations so that there is
less likelihood that money-launderers have advance warning to shift assets
quickly; (ii) serving as a cost-effective way to enforce financial crimes
legislation; (iii) allowing investors to know company ownership players in
order to facilitate honest trade and make informed decisions on investments;
and (iv) building greater trust among civil society in the battle to combat
crime and corruption. 212 To accomplish this requires an international
208
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consensus on the levels of company ownership based on function and
intention, as well as a consensus on the exact threshold of beneficial
ownership that should trigger legal and policy actions to prevent illicit use of
corporate vehicles, trusts, control structures, and other arrangements. For
example, it is possible that the norm of 5% initial threshold to trigger
beneficial ownership reporting is too cumbersome, costly and ineffective for
the purposes of monitoring a shareholder whose intention is to control the
company,213 especially considering that only a 2% (as in Malaysia) or 1% (as
in Russia) initial threshold is necessary to monitor corruption and moneylaundering. In short, a more nuanced, targeted approach would yield more
effective outcomes.214 A nuanced and targeted regime would also reduce the
fear of engaging in positive and legitimate shareholder activities aimed at
monitoring management performance, facilitating genuine shareholder
activism, reducing horizontal and vertical agency costs, and encouraging
stability in share price and company valuation.
3. Understanding the Impact of Corporate Vehicles
A third outstanding issue is the need for more focused research,
understanding, and regulation regarding the impact of trusts, nominee
accounts, omnibus accounts, cash-settled derivatives, cash-settled swaps and
control-enhancing mechanisms, and arrangements on hidden company
ownership. As evidence by the aforementioned studies and analysis in
previous sections, there are extensive use of trusts, nominee accounts,
omnibus accounts and control-enhancing mechanisms in each jurisdiction.

content/uploads/2014/05/TI-G20-Position-papers-Beneficial-Ownership.pdf;
Cf.
Verret, supra note 51, at 890-91 (discussing the legitimate business privacy needs for
keeping control structures and beneficial ownership out of the public realm,
something which the U.S. Levin Bill would allegedly jeopardise by increasing the
costs to maintain business privacy, especially given the Freedom of Information Act
and the right-to-know laws in nearly 40 states in the U.S.); see generally 76 C.J.S.
Records § 113 (2009); 37A Am. Jur. 2d Freedom of Information Acts § 56 (2010);
Backer, supra note 62, at 4 (discussing how transparency can increase “legitimacy
(norm) and accountability (technique) among stakeholders”).
213
See, e.g., Fleischer and Schmolke, supra note 96, at 126-28 (discussing how,
despite the 5% threshold set in the EU Transparency Directive, EU member nations
are not following this notification threshold and some are even imposing additional
notification thresholds not included in the Directive, thus leading to lack of
harmonization in applying the Transparency Directive).
214
See, e.g.,, Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 16-17 (discussing the disadvantages of a
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A 2011 World Bank study found trusts to be the second largest
vehicle behind corporations to be used for corruption.215 In addition, one of
the biggest criticisms of the U.S. proposed ITLEAA legislation is that it fails
to require disclosure and tracking of beneficial ownership information from
trusts, foundations, non-profit organisations and other legal structures, which
are used for illicit financial gain and for fostering financial crimes.216
In the case of nominee accounts, a nominee shareholder creates “a
company… for the purpose of holding shares and other securities on behalf of
investors.” 217 Shares and other securities are held in trust for the actual
beneficial owner.218 For foreign investors, in most jurisdictions, shares and
securities may only be held through a nominee account in a foreign
intermediary because the foreign shareholder is now allowed to participate
directly or register directly with the local jurisdiction’s central securities
depositories. Thus, at the local level, only the nominee account holder’s name
appears on the issuer’s share register, which would provide an opportunity to
beneficial owners, though sometimes unintentionally in the case of foreign
investors, to shield their identity and make it more difficult to control
expropriation by controlling shareholders.219
Similarly, there are serious issues with concealing identities of
beneficial owners through omnibus accounts. An omnibus account is opened
in the name of the account provider and serves “as an umbrella securities
account covering a large number of individual accounts.”220 While omnibus
accounts help in reducing transaction costs, issuers only show the primary
account holder (intermediary) on the share register, thus reducing visibility of
the breakdown of beneficial owners behind omnibus accounts.
In addition, the use of derivatives and related techniques, such as
cash-settled equity derivatives and cash-settled swaps, are yet another way to
reduce, or avoid altogether, the disclosure of beneficial owners. Cash-settled
derivatives are used “to obtain effective control of the underlying shares
215
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without the need for disclosure…” 221 The cash-settled swap agreement
essentially “results in a decoupling of the voting rights from the beneficial
ownership of the shares…lead[ing] to ‘hidden ownership’ and ‘empty voting’
issues.” 222Hidden ownership allows an investor to maintain an undisclosed
“long position in the shares of a listed company… until the investor
physically acquires the shares”223 or settlement is finalised.
While the UK and France have already taken steps to combat hidden
ownership issues, and other EU member states such as Italy, the Netherlands
and Portugal are discussing solutions, 224 there is no EU-wide or even
international solution to the ramifications of “hidden ownership” at this stage.
In empty voting scenarios, the voting “occurs when the shareholder on record
date is no longer the economic owner when the vote closes”225 as in the case
where there is a long period of time between a company’s annual meeting
date when voting occurs and the record date. According to Hu and Black,
“empty voters” are “persons whose voting rights substantially exceed their
net economic ownership.”226 Despite this, the derivatives broker “votes the
shares as directed by the investor.” According to Schouten and confirmed by
a variety of scholars, empty voting can pose a serious threat or undermine the
decision-making process in shareholder meetings. 227 Empty voting issues
may be combined with over-voting228 or negative voting to distort or mask
the identity of beneficial owners as well as impair legitimate decision-making
processes within a listed company.
Finally,

control-enhancing

mechanisms

such

as

shareholder

agreements, pyramid ownership structures, and cross-holding ownership
structures229 are designed to give controlling investors voting/control rights in
excess of their cash-flow rights,230 in part by separating voting rights from
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Prevent It, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 237, 237-49 (2008); Shaun Martin & Frank
Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 775 (2005).
228
Corney et al, supra note 56, at 35.
229
Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 13-14.
230
Id.
222

158

Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.

Vol. XVI

cash-flow rights.231 Pyramid structures are used extensively in Europe and,
until recently, in Asian countries, though there is a declining trend in Asia
because of legislation’s efforts in preventing such use.232 Such structures are
used “to allow shareholders to retain substantial voting power” 233 while
reducing liquidity constraints. Control-enhancing mechanisms not only
reduce visibility of beneficial ownership but, according to empirical studies,
such mechanisms impose a negative impact on firm value.234 A heightened
sense of policy imperatives needs to be aimed at understanding and
improving the transparency of beneficial ownership in these various
arrangements.
4.

Use of Technology

The final outstanding issue, resolution to which can make a big
impact on achieving the goals of public transparency of beneficial ownership,
is making greater and more strategic use of technological innovations to
automate the process of receiving, verifying, analyzing, and reporting
beneficial ownership information.235
As evidenced by the analysis of the jurisdictions in the
aforementioned studies, each jurisdiction has their own technology platform
and procedures for recording beneficial ownership information, even
including websites to share that information as part of a national and private
register. However, the studies point to unreasonable inefficiencies in the
processes for capturing, verifying and reporting on this data. There are also
unnecessary complexities in the overall beneficial disclosure and enforcement

231

Id.; see Schouten, supra note 12, at 138-39; Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock
Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency
Costs of Separating Control From Cash-Flow Rights, CONCENTRATED CORPORATE
OWNERSHIP 20 (R. Morck ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000); Sanford Grossman and
Oliver Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 175, 175 (1988).
232
Vermeulen, supra note 30, at 13-14, 34-36 (discussing the use of pyramid
ownership structures in Europe generally, Italy, China, Indonesia and other Asian
countries as well as its decline in some nations because of legislation banning it).
233
Id. at 13; see also Verret, supra note 51, at 869-70 (discussing stock pyramids and
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regime by the continuing use of manual forms, 236 including the issuer’s
considerable expenses in requests for disclosure of beneficial owners, ,
irregular updating of information, lack of sufficient technology infrastructure
for consistent reporting, and having to submit multiple disclosure requests for
chain of corporate vehicles hiding beneficial owners.
Today, technological innovations such as cloud-based systems,
mobile technology, and security-enabled encryption services can be used to
automate the process of receiving, verifying, updating, analyzing and
reporting beneficial ownership data on an international scale. Both in theory
and in practice, a “one-stop-shop for disclosure of beneficial ownership
information” is possible. This can serve as the foundation of a global public
register, which creates trust among the investment community and ensures
that those who seek to engage in illicit activity through hidden company
ownership have a strong deterrent to doing so.
B.

Impact on Corporate Performance

With respect to whether mandatory disclosure of beneficial company
ownership, which is made publicly transparent, has an impact on corporate
performance, Mazars’s assessment on the EU Transparency Directive seems
to answer this in the negative. According to Mazar’s analysis, 69% of
shareholders “do not consider the compliance cost with periodic information
obligations to be too onerous.”237 Issuers subject to the EU Transparency
Directive’s ownership disclosure obligations also tend to “publish more than
the minimum requirements regarding half-yearly and quarterly financial
information.”238 Perhaps this explains why 82% of respondents felt that the
published information was useful in making investment decisions and 70% of
stakeholders had positive comments about the quality of the published
information, stating that it was “pertinent to making an informed assessment
as to the financial position of the issuer.” 239 Furthermore, 58% of
stakeholders stated that the notification of major holdings requirement under
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the Directive “do not result in an unreasonable increase of burden on the
company.”240
At the same time, there was a consensus that the timing of disclosure
requirements should take into account the needs of SMEs and impact on its
company performance in meeting the ownership disclosure obligations.241 In
addition, while the periodic reporting requirements enhance accountability
and provide certain confidence to investors, there is no regime to ascertain
whether false or misleading information has been disclosed. 242 If this
important verification process were triangulated like information in a
scientific field, it would better serve the legislative intent and purpose of the
EU Transparency Directive.
Fleisher and Schmolke also highlight that the regime on disclosure of
major shareholdings is severely impacted by the high level of fragmentation
across the twenty-seven member states of the EU in adopting and
implementing the Transparency Directive, leading to “significant costs on the
investor.”243 For a listed company that is an institutional investor, it would
certainly impact corporate performance to the extent that these costs cut into
other important development priorities and income streams. As a listed
company (both EU and non-EU), having to follow different notification
thresholds across twenty-seven jurisdictions (not to mention the different
methods of notification and levels of information) will certainly increase
compliance costs for the company. 244 This fragmentation may ultimately
“give rise to a tangible threat of significant distortions of competition in the
market for corporate influence and control.” 245 Under the minimum
ownership disclosure requirements and thresholds of the Transparency
Directive, EU member states can impose requirements that are more stringent
and create an environment of regulatory competition among EU member
states.246 This is neither effective nor efficient in terms of overall competition
between EU companies and non-EU entities.
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While the EU Transparency Directive generally receives positive
responses from stakeholders, the US ITLEAA bill will negatively affect
company performance and potentially trample on business privacy. The
largest negative impact is compliance cost. For example, existing businesses,
especially small businesses, will incur significant costs in meeting the
ownership disclosure requirements because they will need to procure
resources to keep up-to-date records and make additional provisions to ensure
access to this data by law enforcement and regulatory agencies. 247 New
companies, both domestic and foreign, will suffer the same costs. In addition,
state governments will incur non-subsidized costs for “hardware, software,
and personnel required to collect, preserve, and make publicly available”248
the beneficial ownership information for thousands of business entities across
the state.
The second negative impact, perhaps more important, is the Levin
Bill’s potential to “change the competitive position of publicly held
companies versus privately held companies.” 249 Foreign governments, or
even foreign companies in foreign nations, may request such information and
use that information to “enhance their competitive position against U.S.
companies”250 or use that information in furtherance of illicit activities, to
avoid law enforcement, or to exploit such information for unlawful gain or
competitive advantage.
Finally, as discussed previously, disclosure of beneficial ownership
information may negatively affect the decision-making processes of a
company. Controlling shareholders as well as minority shareholders are not
able to objectively assess management performance and guide the company
towards achieving shareholder value without recriminations.
Overall, despite potential concerns about the impact of beneficial
ownership disclosure on corporate performance, a disclosure regime shall still
247
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Id. at 861(citing Examining State Business Incorporation Practices: A Discussion
of S. 569: the Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act:
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111th Cong. 8 (2009)).
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protect shareholder value and prevent unlawful activity or hostile takeovers251
while allowing public transparency in ownership that is necessary to manage
company performance. Such an ownership disclosure regime can only benefit
the company’s performance and increase the legitimacy of transparent
company ownership disclosure regimes while also boosting investor
confidence.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the growing debate on
mandating company ownership disclosure, its impact on capital markets, and
contributions or constraints on corporate performance.
Recent international and comparative studies as well as market
analyses indicate that, while much has been accomplished by way of
legislating mandatory disclosure of beneficial ownership information within
national borders, the deafening pace of innovation in financial instruments as
well as the creative use of corporate vehicles across international jurisdictions
have made existing accomplishments moot in terms of fighting cross-border
illicit activities and financial crimes.
This article argues that, on balance, mandatory ownership disclosure
and enforcement regimes have a more positive contribution to company
performance than any constraints they may impose. At the same time, to
achieve the much-desired goal of a publicly transparent beneficial ownership
regime, greater focus and effort is needed in the areas of harmonized
definitions of beneficial ownership and transparency, harmonized, integrated
and consistent cross-border ownership disclosure thresholds, notification
frameworks that leverage technology and reduce procedural pitfalls and
inefficiencies,

reduced

or

subsidized

compliance

cost

management

frameworks, especially for small business owners, and increased political will
across all major developed and developing economies towards combatting
the illicit use of corporate vehicles for unlawful gain. In a global economy,
the real competition is not between well-meaning domestic companies or
cross-border, multinational enterprises. The real competition is between all of
these legitimate, innovative corporations and those who seek to use such
vehicles for terrorism financing, money laundering, tax evasion, cross-border
251

See generally Kalant, supra note 3, at 1059-66 (discussing, in particular, the
potential positive impact of U.S.’s ITLEAA bill on combatting illicit activity,
exposing the use of shell corporations for illegal purposes and improving law
enforcement’s ability to expose and prosecute financial crimes such as money
laundering that affect taxpayers and the government).
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arms sales, and manipulation of shareholder voting rights and capital markets.
The battle has just begun.

